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ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. raises
many questions, most importantly, how the test for obviousness applied in the United States
("U.S.") now compares with that applied in the United Kingdom ("U.K.") and by the European
Patent Office ("EPO"). In seeking to answer those questions, this article explores the history of
obviousness and the tests for inventive step in the United States, the U.K. and the European
Patent Office. A comparison of the United States Patent and Trademark Office and EPO
examination guidelines, suggests that it would have been a good idea to inform the U.S. patent
examiners that if an applicant can demonstrate a new and unexpected result, this is strong
prima facie evidence of inventive step, a fact supported by several opinions of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Experience in the EPO is that where an applicant can demonstrate a credible
technical problem that he has solved, he will almost always be granted a patent. This article
asserts that instructions to examiners are of general importance because they are the main
tool used during examination and the important event for most applicants is grant or refusal
by the patent office. Thus, quality patent examination is not just a matter of ensuring that
applications lacking merit are reliably refused, but also of ensuring that meritorious
applications are reliably granted.
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INTRODUCTION

When it first reached the United States Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"), the
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.1 case was said to be all about the
collocation/combination test. 2 In its opinion, the Supreme Court expressed qualified
approval of that test, but omitted to apply it to the facts about which it had to decide
and instead reached its decision on other grounds, 3 which could be regarded as a
curious incident4 and perhaps a clue to an implicit intention of the court. It is
submitted that it was not an accidental omission, but instead was a deliberate policy
decision that amounted to a tacit but significant change of position, as will be
explained below.
Under the common law, only the ratio decidendi of a decision is binding in
subsequent cases-i.e. that abstract principle of law which determined the
judgment. 5 Nothing else is binding; although, it may be a highly persuasive obiter
dictum.6 It is plain on the face of the KSR opinion that the same outcome could have
been reached without any mention whatsoever of the collocation/combination test
and of the controversial decision in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equipment Corp.7 Therefore, questions arise: what weight (if any) should now be
given to the collocation/combination test, how it fits into the framework for applying
the statutory language of 35 USC §103 set out in Graham v. John Deere Co., 8 and
how the test for obviousness applied in the United States ("U.S.") now compares with
that applied in the United Kingdom ("U.K.") and by the European Patent Office
("EPO").
*European Patent Attorney, CIPA authorized IP litigator, Visiting Professor of IP Law,
Bournemouth University.
1 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
2 Id. at 1739.
3 Id. at 1741-42.
4 See SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES, available
at http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/d/doyle/arthur-conan/d75me/silver.blaze.html.
"Is there any
point to which you would wish to draw my attention?' 'To the curious incident of the dog in the
night-time.' 'The dog did nothing in the night-time.' 'That was the curious incident,' remarked
Sherlock Holmes." Id.
5 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (8th ed. 2004).
GId. at 1102.
7 See Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)
(reversing the lower courts and finding the patent invalid based because the lower courts used a
standard of invention which was "less exacting than that required where a combination is made up
entirely of old components"); see also Paul Cole, Supermarket Check-outs Revisited, PATENT WORLD,
Mar. 1988, at 12-17 (stating that amongst other difficulties with that decision, the art of providing
equipment for playing pool was considered analogous to the art of designing equipment for
supermarkets, and a closed three-sided frame for assembling the balls used in pool was equated
with a three-sided open frame for collecting, moving and discharging goods on a supermarket
counter).
8 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1966); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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I. TESTS FOR INVENTIVE STEP UNDER THE COMMON LAW

A late development, obviousness is a concept derived from judicial opinions and
inclusion of a statutory requirement that claimed subject matter should not be
obvious. 9 It is to be found neither in the U.K. Statute of Monopolies 1623, nor in the
U.S. Constitution. Obviousness was not included in any U.K. statute up to 1932, nor
in any U.S. statute up to 1952.
In Graham, the Supreme Court referred to Thomas Jefferson's active interest in
and influence on the development of the patent system, and held that his conclusions
on patentability "are worthy of note." 10 Jefferson's views were summarized in the
following terms:
Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge,
and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited
private monopoly. Jefferson did not believe in granting patents for small
details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices. His writings evidence
his insistence upon a high level of patentability. 11
Therefore, it is appropriate to consider briefly the role of Jefferson in the
development of the U.S. patent system and the views that he expressed in the letters
quoted by the Supreme Court in Graham.
The first U.S. Patent Act of 1790 provided that any person or persons could
petition the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the department for War, or the
Attorney General that they "hath or have invented 12 or discovered1 3 any useful art,

9 Soo also Am. Braided Wire Co. v. Thomson, (1889) 44 Ch.D. 274, 6 R.P.C. 518, 528 (C.A.
1890) (introducing considerations of obviousness); Patents and Designs Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c.
32, § 3 (Eng.) (stating a patent may be invalidated when "the invention is obvious and does not
involve any inventive step having regard to what was known or used prior to the date of the
patent"); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (setting forth the conditions for patentability, specifically nonobvious subject matter); Graham, 383 U.S. at 14 (stating "patentability is to depend, in addition to
novelty and utility, upon the 'non-obvious' nature of the 'subject matter sought to be patented').
10 Graham, 383 U.S. at 7.
11Id. at 9.
12Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-110 (repealed 1793) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2006)). The word "invention" was used early on to mean something created or devised.
See SIR THOMAS ELYOT, THE BOKE NAMED THE GOVERNOUR LONDON, Vol. 1, at 273-74 (Henry
Herbert Stephen Croft ed., Kegal, Paul, Trench, & Co., London, 1883) (1531). Elyot, a courtier of
Henry VIII and a friend of Sir Thomas More, wrote: "undoubtedly they that write of the firste
inuentions of thinges, haue good cause to suppose Lucifer, prince of deuilles, to be the first
inuentour of dise playinge, and helle the place where it was founden." (sic) Id.
13Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, sec. 1, 1 Stat. at 110. The term "discover" originally meant expose
in the sense of betray; discoverer originally meant "informer." The modern meaning, to obtain
knowledge or sight of that which was not known, dates from 1535. Soo, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 357 (11th ed. 2005). About the time when the U.S. Constitution was being
drafted, a range of meanings of the word discover was in existence. See generally WILLIAM HANDS,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS (W. Clarke & Sons 1808). The following
passages are relevant to the meaning of the term "discover": "the discoverer of the expansive force of
steam"; "the publisher of the discovery"; "as the patentee's reward for the discovery"; "most of the
cases which have arisen upon patents, have been decided against the patentees, upon the grounds of
their not having made full and fair discoveries of their inventions." Id. at 5, 7-8, 12. The U.S.
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manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before
known or used" and that a patent might be granted if the invention or discovery was
"sufficiently useful and important." 14 It also provided for pre-grant examination
whether the letters patent was "conformable to this Act," and it is believed that this
was the first provision for pre-grant examination of patent applications on their
merits anywhere in the world. 15 As noted in Graham, Jefferson served as Secretary
of State and while a member of the "patent board" was well aware of the "difficulty of
'drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment
of an exclusive patent, and those which are not'." 16 Jefferson also explained some of
the rules that the board evolved to exclude patents for certain types of subject
matter:
(a) a mere change of use of an existing machine, e.g. the use of "a screw for
crushing plaster might be employed for crushing corn cobs" or the use of "a
chain pump for raising water might be used for raising wheat";
(b) a mere change of form, e.g. "a high-quartered shoe instead of a low one; a
round hat instead of a three-square; or a square bucket instead of a round
one";
(c) a mere change of material, e.g. "a ploughshare of cast rather than of
wrought iron; a comb of iron instead of horn or of ivory, or the connecting
17
buckets by a band of leather rather than of hemp or iron."
At least some of these rules were incorporated into the U.S. Patent Act, 1793,
Ch. 11, Section 2 which pointed towards a future test for inventive step insofar as it
provided inter al'a that "simply changing the form or the proportions of any machine,
or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery."1 8 The
inclusion of the word "simply" deprives the statute of its bright-line character, and it
is apparent that its exclusion would not necessarily cover a change of form or
proportions giving rise to a new effect.
Section 3 of the 1793 statute pointed towards a requirement for patent claims
insofar as it required the inventor to "fully explain the principle, and the several
modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character, by
which it may be distinguished from other inventions." 19
The examination provided for by the 1790 statute took more time than the
members of the patent board could spare from their other duties, and in 1793 the
Patent Act of 1790 uses the expression "invention or discovery," which points to a finding itself
rather than to a disclosure of that finding. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, sec. 1, 1 Stat. at 110.
However, it may be that both senses are implied.
14 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, sec. 1, 1 Stat. at 110.
15Id.

16Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac M'Pherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in VI THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON:
BEING HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, MESSAGES,
ADDRESES AND OTHER WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE, 1790-1826, at 181 (H. A. Washington ed.,

1859) [hereinafter Letter, Isaac M'Pherson]. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9
(1965) (noting that Thomas Jefferson served as Secretary of State).
17 Letter, Issac M'Pherson, supranote 16, at 181-82.
18 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, sec. 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2006)) (emphasis added).
19
Id. at 321-22.
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U.S. patent system reverted to mere registration, with the validity of granted patents
being determined by the courts. 20 Jefferson did not approve of this development,
believing that examination of patents required technical rather than legal skills:
Instead of refusing a patent in the first instance, as the board was
authorized to do, the patent now issues of course, subject to be[ing] declared
void on such principles as should be established by the courts of law. This
business, however, is but a little analogous to their course of reading, since
we might in vain turn over all the lubberly volumes of the law to find a
single ray which would lighten the path of the mechanic or the
mathematician. It is more within the information of a board of academical
professors, and a previous refusal of patent would better guard our citizens
against harassment by law-suits. But England had given it to her judges,
21
and the usual predominancy of her examples carried it to ours.

The correspondence of Thomas Jefferson, quoted by the Supreme Court in
Graham, concerns the flour milling inventions of Oliver Evans, who was one of the
distinguished inventors of the Founding Father generation and who deserves to be
numbered with John Fitch and Robert Fulton. 22 In addition to his flour milling
inventions, Oliver Evans experimented with steam engines and a "steam-driven land
carriage." 23 Evans made three inventions concerning improved mills which were
evaluated by Jefferson, 24 and which are discussed briefly below because they
demonstrate how he applied the requirements of novelty and sufficient "importance":
(a) A device called the Hopper Boy for cooling and drying flour immediately
after it had been ground and before it was packed. This took the form of a
pan for receiving the flour and a rake for turning over the flour which was
connected to and moved with the mill machinery. Of this, Jefferson said,
25
It
"[t]he Hopper-Boy is a useful machine and, so far as I know original."

turned out, however, that others had made and used similar devices before

20 Compare Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793) (current version at
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)) (providing for the granting of patents if deemed "sufficiently useful and

important"), with Patent Act of 1793, Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, sec. 2, 1 Stat. at 320 (removing the

phrase "sufficiently useful and important").
21 Letter, Isaac M'Pherson, supra note 16, at 182.
22 Id.; see also Thomas P. Jones, Preface to OLIVER EVANS, THE YOUNG MILL-WRIGHT AND
MILLER'S GUIDE, vi (Blanchard and Lea 1860) (likening the contributions of Oliver Evans to that of
Whitney and Fulton).
23 See Albert Shaw, ed., Eighteenth-CenturyAutomobiles, 60 AM. REV. OF REV., Oct. 1919, at
443 (citing Oliver Evans application for patent for a vehicle driven by steam).
24 See Letter, Isaac M'Pherson, supra note 16, at 175 (describing subject of letter as Mr. Oliver
Evans' exclusive right to the use of what he calls his elevators, conveyors, and hopper-boys); see also
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (Jan. 16, 1814), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON:

BEING HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, MESSAGES, ADDRESES AND

OTHER WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE, 1790-1826, at 297 (H. A. Washington ed., 1859)
[hereinafter Letter, Oliver Evans] (describing evaluation of elevators, conveyors and hopper-boys).
25 Letter, Isaac M'Pherson, supra note 16, at 180.
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Evans, and the relevant patent was eventually held to be invalid by the
26
Supreme Court ;
(b) A screw conveyor for flour and grain. Jefferson gave this qualified
approval: "The screw of Archimedes is as ancient, at least, as the age of
that mathematician, who died more than 2,000 years ago .. the cutting of
its spiral worm into sections for conveying flour or grain, seems to have
been an invention of Mr. Evans, and to be a fair subject of a patent right.
But it cannot take away from others the use of Archimedes' screw with its
27
perpetual spiral, for any purposes of which it is susceptible."
(c) A conveyor based on a chain of buckets mounted on an endless leather
strap. Jefferson was firmly of the view that the conveyor was not an
invention because the leather strap which was added by Evans was not a
28
patentable difference :
.

The question then whether such a string of buckets was invented
first by Oliver Evans, is a mere question of fact in mathematical
history. Now, turning to such books only as I happen to possess, I
find abundant proof that this simple machinery has been in use from
time immemorial. Doctor Shaw, who visited Egypt and the Barbary
coast in the years 1727-8-9, in the margin of his map of Egypt, gives
us the figure of what he calls a Persian wheel ... his figure, and the
verbal description of the Universal History, prove that the string of
buckets is meant under that name. His figure differs from Evans'
construction in the circumstances of the buckets being round, and
strung through their bottom on a chain. But it is the prineiple,to wit,
a string of buckets, which constitutes the invention, not the form of
the buckets, round, square, or hexagon; nor the manner of attaching
them, nor the material of the connecting band, whether chain, rope,
or leather....
•.. These verbal descriptions, applying so exactly to Mr. Evans'
elevators, and the drawings exhibited to the eye, flash conviction both
on reason and the senses that there is nothing new in these elevators
but their being strung together on a strap of leather. If this strap of
leather be an invention, entitling the inventor to a patent right, it can
only extend to the strap, and the use of the string of buckets must
remain free to be connected by chains, ropes, a strap of hempen
girthing, or any other substance except leather. But, indeed, Mr.
29
Martin had before used the strap of leather.
One of the main achievements of Oliver Evans was to combine items of
equipment so that a mill could be operated in a largely automatic manner with

See Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 435 (1822).
Isaac M'Pherson, supra note 16, at 179.
28 Id. at 177, 179.
29 Id.(emphasis added).
26

27 Letter,
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considerable saving in the manpower needed. 30
However, Jefferson was not
persuaded that combining known items of equipment to achieve this somewhat
generalized result was inventive. 31 In a subsequent letter to Oliver Evans, he said:
Recurring now to the words of your definition, do they mean that, while all
are free to use the old string of buckets, and Archimedes' screw for the
purposes to which they had been formerly applied, you alone have the
exclusive right to apply them to the manufacture of flour? [T]hat no one
has a right to apply his old machines to all the purposes of which they are
susceptible? [T]hat every one, for instance, who can apply the hoe, the
spade, or the axe to any purpose to which they have not been before applied,
may have a patent for the exclusive right to that application? [Aind may
exclude all others, under penalties, from so using their hoe, spade, or axe?
If this be the meaning, my opinion that the legislature never meant by the
patent law to sweep away so extensively the rights of their constituents, to
environ everything they touch with snares, is expressed in the letter of
August 13, from which I have nothing to retract, nor ought to add but the
observation that if a new application of our old machines be a ground of
monopoly, the patent law will take from us much more good than it will
give. Perhaps it may mean another thing, that while every one has a right
to the distinct and separate use of the buckets, the screw, the hopper-boy, in
their old forms, the patent gives you the exclusive right to combine their
uses on the same object. But if we have a right to use three things
separately, I see nothing in reason, or in the patent law, which forbids our
using them all together. A man has a right to use a saw, an axe, a plane,
separately; may he not combine their uses on the same piece of wood? He
has a right to use his knife to cut his meat, a fork to hold it; may a patentee
take from him the right to combine their use on the same subject? Such a
law, instead of enlarging our conveniences, as was intended, would most
fearfully abridge them, and crowd us by monopolies out of the use of the
32
things we have.
It is apparent from the above quotation that the "high level of patentability"
referred to by the Supreme Court in Graham deserves explanation in the light of the
detailed content of these documents. Clearly Jefferson's view that patents for small
details, obvious improvements, and frivolous devices is supported by his writings. It
is also clear that Jefferson did not approve of patents for mere collocations. 33 But
there is little support for the proposition that he advocated any qualitative test. It
seems that Jefferson's view was that patentable novelty was an issue of fact to be
decided objectively having regard to the relevant state of the art as evidenced, e.g. by
the books that in his library, that the question had a simple yes or no answer, and
30 Thomas P. Jones, Prefaceto OLIVER EVANS, THE YOUNG MILL-WRIGHT AND MILLER'S GUIDE,
vi (Blanchard and Lea 1860) (stating that even forty years after Evans first made improvements to
the flour mill, American mills were superior to mills in Great Britain).
31 Letter, Oliver Evans, supra note 24, at 298-99
32 Jd
33 Id.
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that Jefferson applied that standard to the facts of the hopper-boy dispute in a
34
manner that is fully in accordance with modern practice.
35
In 1836, a new patent act was passed setting up the U.S. Patent Office.
However, the provisions relating to form and proportions were not re-enacted, which
implies acceptance of the proposition that patentability is to be decided according to
36
the evidence and that bright-line rules cannot be devised.
Although a requirement for inventive step was implicit in earlier U.K. and U.S.
decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.3 7 attributed its
origin in U.S. law to the opinion in Hotehkiss v. Greenwood M insofar as that opinion
called for a comparison between the subject matter of the patent or application and
the background skill of the calling and for determination of patentability on the basis
of that comparison. 39 But the words of the U.S. Constitution and of the patent
statutes at that time referred to "inventor" and "discovery". It was natural that the
courts repeatedly returned to the language of the statutes which were then in force,
although this lead to what was euphemistically referred to in Graham as "a large
variety of expressions in decisions and writings." 40 The opinion of Justice Douglas in
Cuno EngineeringCorp. vAutomatic Devices Corp.41 was particularly singled out. It
not only equated a requirement for "more ingenuity ... than the work of a mechanic
skilled in the art" with a requirement for "a flash of creative genius," but also used
the word "merely" to denigrate the production of a "more efficient, useful, and
convenient article," which has elements of self-contradiction. 42 For these reasons, in
1952, Congress codified the inventiveness requirement in § 103 and defined the
operative requirement to be "non-obviousness" which was believed to be more definite
than "invention." 43 However, the attempt to sweep away existing judicial precedents
See Letter, Isaac M'Pherson, supra note 16, at 177-79.
a5 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, sec. 1, 5 Stat. 117, 117-118 (repealed 1870) (current version at
34

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)).
36 Compare Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, sec. 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836) (current version
at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)) (providing that "simply changing the form or the proportions of any
machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery."), with Patent
Act of 1836, ch. 357, sec.1, 5 Stat. at 118. (failing to include language concerning form or proposition
and stating that a patentee must "particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or
combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery").
37 383 U.S. 1 (1966)
38 52 U.S. (1 How.) 248 (1851).
'39Id. at 267. The Supreme Court held that a patentable invention must demonstrate more
ingenuity and skill than an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business would possess. Id.
40 Graham, 383 U.S. at 14.
The Supreme Court noted that the "invention" language of
Hotchkiss was ambiguous when compared to Congress' "nonobviousness" test found within the
Patent Act of 1952. Id.
41 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
42
Id. at 90-91.
43 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 103
(2006)). The section addressing non-obvious subject matter states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.
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and lower the threshold for patentability (if there ever was such a threshold) was
unsuccessful since the Graham court held that the revision was not intended to
44
change the general level of patentability but merely to codify existing precedents.
As is familiar, Graham sets out an algorithmic approach requiring three factual
enquiries to be made before the issue is determined, the steps of the algorithm being
to:
(a) determine the scope and content of the prior art;
(b) ascertain the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
(c) resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and then
(d) against this background determine the obviousness or non-obviousness
45
of the claimed subject matter.
Courts decide cases according to the evidence, and it is strongly arguable that to
do otherwise denies the parties due process. It is therefore not surprising that after
specifying matters that should be covered in evidence, the approach leaves the court
with the same freedom of decision that it had before. Clearly the evidence that might
be submitted is not limited to the required factual enquiries and could, for example
on behalf of a patentee, cover the achievement of a new result, the unexpected nature
of that result, and whether the prior art relied on teaches towards or away from the
invention.46
In addition to this technical evidence, the Court held that
circumstantial evidence or "secondary considerations," might be relevant, including
commercial success, the length of time that the problem solved by the invention had
47
existed and the efforts of others to solve the problem.
Interestingly, the outcome in Graham was the result of simple factual enquiries
directed to the technical merit of the invention and without circumstantial evidence
playing any part whatsoever, although as noted above it is clearly admissible. 48 The
invention was a third generation improvement patent relating to a chisel plow, and
the allegedly patentable difference was reversal in position of the shanks and their
fixing brackets, which was said to have the advantage of increasing the length over
which the shanks could flex. 49 The patentees said that this difference in flexing,
though small, effectively absorbed the tremendous forces of the shock of obstructions
whereas prior art arrangements failed. 50
However, the Court held that the
Id.
44Graham, 383 U.S. at 3-4.
45Id. at 17.
46 See Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Where
there is a range disclosed in the prior art, and the claimed invention falls within that range, there is
a presumption of obviousness. But the presumption will be rebutted if it can be shown: (1) that the

prior art taught away from the claimed invention, or (2) that there are new and unexpected results
relative to the prior art.").
47Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
48See generally id. at 19-26 (applying the conditions of patentability to the patent in issue in

Graham v. John Deere, including discussion of the invention factually, the background of the patent,
the prior art and the obviousness of the differences). The patent at issue was "No. 2,627,798 ...
relat[ing] to a spring clamp which permit[ed] plow shanks to be pushed upward when they hit
obstructions in the soil." d. at 19-20.
4)Id.at 22-23.
50Id. at 23.
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differences were minor and within the skill of those in the art, and that the alleged
advantages associated with the difference were not credible because no such function
was hinted at in the specification, nothing had been said about it during prosecution
before the Patent Office, and cross-examination of the expert witness for the patentee
showed that the alleged advantage was insignificant. 51 The relevant passage of
cross-examination is set out below:
Q. Do you regard the small degree of flex in the forward end of the shank
that lies between the pivot point and the point of spring attachment to be of
any significance or any importance to the functioning of a device such as
798?
A. Unless you are approaching the elastic limit, I think this flexing will
reduce the maximum stress at the point of pivot there, where the maximum
stress does occur. I think it will reduce that. I don't know how much.
Q. Do you think it is a substantial factor, a factor of importance in the
functioning of the structure?
52
A. Not a great factor, no.
In hindsight, it is surprising with this devastating testimony on the record that
Graham went anywhere near the Supreme Court; a settlement prior to first instance
judgment would have been a wiser strategy for the patentees.
What extra does the KSR opinion contribute? Its contribution is the finding that
the "court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would naturally employ." 53 The observation that evidence of
a known problem for which there was an obvious solution points towards
obviousness. 54 An acknowledgement, however, that "inventions in most, if not all,
instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and that claimed
discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already
known." 55 Admonitions to avoid rigid preventative rules that "deny fact finders
recourse to ordinary common sense" and to realize that "a person of ordinary skill is a
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton." 56 Increased willingness to consider
arguments of the "obvious to try" type. 57 As Justice Kennedy might concede, the
KSR opinion is of a conservative character within the general ambit of the Graham
decision, and calls for changes in approach which the Federal Circuit had very
largely already adopted before it was handed down. 58
In the U.K., the concept of obviousness was introduced in the speeches of Lord
60
Herschell in American Braided Wire Co. v. Thompson59 and in Vickers v. Siddel,

51Id. at 25.
52 Id. at 25 n.13.
53 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
54 Id. at 1742.
5 Id. at 1741.
56 Id. at 1742.
57

Jd

o5 See

generallyid.at 1745-46.
,5(1889) 44 Ch.D. 274, 6 R.P.C. 518 (A.C. 1890).
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but obviousness only became a statutory ground of objection in 1932.61 The current
test is set out in Windsurfing Internationalv. Tabur Marine,62 as modified by Pozzoli
SPA v. BDMO SA, 63 and also involves an algorithmic sequence of questions followed
by a decision-making step as indicated below:

[(-)] identify the art or field of endeavour in which the invention arises];64
(i) identify the notional "person skilled in the art";
(ii) identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person;
(iii) identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot
readily be done, construe it;
(iv) identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as
forming part of the "state of the art" and the inventive concept of the claim
or the claim as construed; and
(v) viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed,
decide whether those differences constitute steps which would have been
obvious to the person skilled in the art or whether they required any degree
65
of invention.
The similarity to the Graham test is self-evident. 6 6 Like its U.S. counterpart,
once the preliminary enquiries have been made an unfettered decision has to be
made according to the evidence. 67 A. W. White and d.C. Warden argued in favour of
60 Vickers v. Siddell, (1890) 15 App. Cas. 496 (H.L.) (U.K.) ("But experience has shown that not
a few inventions.., have been of so simple a character that when once they were made known it
was difficult ... not to believe that they must have been obvious to everyone.").
61 Patents and Designs Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 32, § 3 (Eng.) (stating a patent may be
invalidated when "the invention is obvious and does not involve any inventive step having regard to
what was known or used prior to the date of the patent").
62 Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain), Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 71 (U.K.)
(stating that obviousness is tested "by hypothesizing what would have been obvious at the priority
date to a person skilled in the art to which the patent in suit relates").
63 [2007] EWCA 588, [14]-[15] (A.C. (Civ. Div.)) (U.K.).
(34See generally id. at [23] (While this step is not expressly enumerated in Pozzoli, it is
implicitly required; otherwise there would be no basis for identifying a skilled person and the
associated knowledge expected of that person.).
G(5Id.

(3 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). Graham requires determination of the
scope and content of the prior art and Windsurfing steps 0 and (iv) correspond insofar as (iv) refers
to the matter cites as forming part of the "state of the art." Compare id., with Windsurfing Int'l Inc.
v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 73-74 (U.K.). It then requires ascertainment
of the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and Windsurfing step (iv) makes the
same requirement. Compare Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, with Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. Tabur Marine
(Great Britain) Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 73-74 (U.K.). It goes on to require resolution of the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art as also required in Windsurfing steps (i) and (ii), the person
skilled in the art not being a real person but being a legal creation reflecting the policy underlying
the law of obviousness. Compare Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, with Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. Tabur
Marine (Great Britain) Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 73-74 (U.K.). It then leaves open what further
evidence may be adduced, as does Windsurfing. Compare Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, with Windsurfing
Int'l Inc. v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 73-74 (U.K.).
(37See Pozzoli, [2007] EWCA 588, [64]-[66] (A.C. (Civ. Div.)) (U.K.) (providing an example of
the step-by-step reassigning by the U.K. courts and holding that the claimed subject matter was
lacking an inventive step, allegations of commercial success were unpersuasive for lack of nexus and
eventual success was the result of good design rather than invention).

[8:1 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

preserving flexibility are advanced and warned that:
"[F]or administrative
convenience, inventiveness may come to be judged by some philosophical metre-stick
and not by a pragmatic approach based on a full consideration of all the facts. This
68
can only lead to the patent system becoming more divorced from reality."
In the outcome these concerns proved unfounded. There has in fact been no
discontinuity between the approach adopted under the previous statutes and that
adopted under the Patents Act 1977; and the previous flexible common law approach
continues to be applied. 69 Section 14 of the U.K. Patents Act, 1977 makes no
reference to technical problem and nor do the U.K. Patent Rules. 70 Therefore, there
has been no legislative push towards application by the U.K. Intellectual Property
Office and courts of a technical, problem-based approach of the European Patent
Office ("EPO") and up to now they have declined to do So.71 However, today, the
courts sometimes their reasoning by reference to EPO Appeal Board decisions to see
whether the same result would be arrived at, such decisions being of persuasive
72
authority in the U.K.

68Alan W. White & J.C. Warden, The British Approach to 'Obviousness,"1977 ANN. OF INDUS.
PROP. LAW 447, 463 (1978) (Eng.).
69See e.g., Research In Motion, Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 335, [2008] All E.R. 250
(Eng.) (reaching the decision on obviousness on the basis of the Windsurng and Pozzolitests and
not on the basis of the problem/solution analysis used by the EPO); Actavis, Ltd. v. Janssen Pharm.
N.V., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 1422, [103], [108]-[125], [2008] All E.R. 429 (Eng.) (same); Alan Nuttall,
Ltd. v Fri-Jado Ltd. & Anor, [2008] EWHC (Pat) 1311, [71]-[80], [2008] All E.R. 153 (Eng.) (same);
Generics, Ltd. v. Daiichi Pharm. Co., Ltd. & Anor, [2008] EWHC (Pat) 2413 [128], [158], [2008] All
E.R. 124 (Eng.) (same); Armour Group v. Leisuretech Elecs. Ltd., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 2797, [63][95], [2008] All E.R. 155 (Eng.) (same).
70See generally Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, pt. I, § 14 (U.K.) (last amended Dec. 17, 2007)
available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsactl977.pdf (setting forth the requirements for the
"making of application" and making no reference to "technical problem"); The Patents Rules, 2007,
S.I. 3291, pt. 11, sec. 15, (U.K.) (setting forth the requirements for the specification and Rule 15
setting forth the requirements for the abstract of a patent, which includes "a technical explanation
of the invention" but neither of which makes any mention of "technical problem").
71Symbian, Ltd, v Comptroller Gen. of Patents, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1066, [16], [2008] All E.R.
75 (Eng.). The U.K. court illustrated its skeptical attitude to the EPO problem/solution analysis by
stating:
Tribunals not infrequently suggest a specific staged approach to resolve issues in
patent cases; obvious examples include the problem/solution approach
recommended in the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office
("the EPO Guidelines"), and the approaches proposed in Windsurfing v. Tabur
Marine [1985] RPC 59 as updated in Pozzoli v. BDMO [2007] EWHC Civ. 588,
[2007] F.S.R. 37 and Improver v Remington [1990] F.S.R. 81. While such staged
approaches are often very valuable, they should not necessarily be followed
blindly in every case. Thus, as Mr. Prescott said, the problem/solution approach is
scarcely appropriate where at least part of the originality involves appreciating
the existence of a problem or the opportunity for an unexpected improvement. In
such a case, one can risk creating an artificial problem before going on to consider
the solution.
Id.
72 See e.g., H. Lundbeck A/S v. Generics, Ltd. & Ors, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 311, [37]-[40] (Eng.)
(discussing the EPO Appeal Board decisions); see also Conor Medsystems, Inc. v Angiotech Pharms.,
Inc. & Ors., [2008] UKHL 49, [31]-[36], [53], [2008] 4 All E.R. 621 (U.K.).
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7 3
In Haberman vJaekellnternational,
the U.K. High Court produced a checklist
of factors which was created in order to facilitate a decision whether or not
commercial success was relevant insofar as it might throw light on the thought
processes which pervaded the relevant industry, but which is self-evidently of wider
applicability and provides a useful check list of evidence which it may be helpful to
adduce:

(a) What was the problem which the patented development addressed?
(Although sometimes a development may be the obvious solution to another
problem, that is not frequently the case);
(b) How long had that problem existed?;
(c) How significant was the problem seen to be?; A problem which was
viewed in the trade as trivial might not have generated much in the way of
efforts to find a solution. So an extended period during which no solution
was proposed (or proposed as a commercial proposition) would throw little
light on whether, technically, it was obvious. Such an extended period of
inactivity may demonstrate no more than that those in the trade did not
believe that finding a solution was commercially worth the effort. The fact,
if it be one, that they had miscalculated the commercial benefits to be
achieved by the solution says little about its technical obviousness and it is
only the latter which counts. On the other hand evidence which suggests
that those in the art were aware of the problem and had been trying to find
a solution will assist the patentee.
(d) How widely known was the problem and how many were likely to be
seeking a solution? Where the problem was widely known to many in the
relevant art, the greater the prospect of it being solved quickly.
(e) What prior art would have been likely to be known to all or most of those
who would have been expected to be involved in finding a solution? A
development may be obvious over a piece of esoteric prior art of which most
in the trade would have been ignorant. If that is so, commercial success
over other, less relevant, prior art will have much reduced significance.
(f) What other solutions were put forward in the period leading up to the
publication of the patentee's development? This overlaps with other factors.
For example, it illustrates that others in the art were aware of the problem
and were seeking a solution. But it also is of relevance in that it may
indicate that the patentee's development was not what would have occurred
to the relevant workers. This factor must be treated with care. As has been
said on more than one occasion, there may be more than one obvious route
round a technical problem. The existence of alternatives does not prevent
each of them from being obvious. On the other hand, where the patentee's
development would have been expected to be at the forefront of solutions to
be found yet it was not and other, more expensive or complex or less
satisfactory, solutions were employed instead, then this may suggest that
the ex post facto assessment that the solution was at the forefront of
possibilities is wrong.

73 [1999] F.S.R. 683 (Ch. (Pat. Ct.)) (U.K.).
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(g) To what extent were there factors which would have held back the
exploitation of the solution even if it was technically obvious? For example,
it may be that the materials or equipment necessary to exploit the solution
were only available belatedly or their cost was so high as to act as a
commercial deterrent. On the other hand if the necessary materials and
apparatus were readily available at reasonable cost, a lengthy period during
which the solution was not proposed is a factor which is consistent with lack
of obviousness.
(h) How well has the patentee's development been received? Once the
product or process was put into commercial operation, to what extent was it
a commercial success? In looking at this, it is legitimate to have regard not
only to the success indicated by exploitation by the patentee and his
licensees but also to the commercial success achieved by infringers.
Furthermore the number of infringers may reflect on some of the other
factors set out above. For example, if there are a large number of infringers
it may be some indication of the number of members of the trade who were
likely to be looking for alternative or improved products (see (iv) above).
(i) To what extent can it be shown that the whole or much of the commercial
success is due to the technical merits of the development, i.e. because it
solves the problem? Success which is largely attributable to other factors,
such as the commercial power of the patentee or his licensee, extensive
advertising focusing on features which have nothing to do with the
development, branding or other technical features of the product or process,
says nothing about the value of the invention.74

II. U.K. AND U.S. - THE PERSUASIVE POWER OF NEW RESULT EVIDENCE
The collocation/combination test has both positive and negative aspects, the
former providing affirmative and persuasive evidence of inventive step. Decisions of
courts in the U.S., the U.K., and of EPO Appeal Boards agree on this point. 75 It is a
matter of experience that the ability to identify a new function or result flowing from
a claimed combination of features is a strong indicator that the claim should be
allowed during official examination and is also a good predictor of validity in court
76
proceedings where the inventive character of a granted patent is in dispute.
It is convenient to consider U.S. and U.K. decisions together because they have
the same legal origin and because in the early 19th century U.K. decisions were
77
widely cited and followed in the U.S.
The positive aspect of the test can be traced back to early days of patent law.
The first (1883) edition of Terrell on Patents quotes Lord Ellenborough in Huddard v.

71Id. at 699-701.
7, See Bendix/Braking Apparatus, [1988] E.P.O.R. 285, 289; United States v. Adams, 383 U.S.
39, 51 (1966).
76 See, e.g., Adams, 383 U.S. at 51 (stating an invention is non-obvious where a combination of
elements yields unexpected results).
77 See R.H. Helmholz, Magna Ca±rta and the Jus Commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV 297, 299-300
(1999).
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Grimshaw,78 "I suppose it will not now be disputed that a new combination of old
79
materials, so as to produce a new effect, may be the subject of a patent.'"
The fact that new effect was key to patentability of combination inventions was
therefore known when Thomas Jefferson was U.S. President, William Pitt was Prime
Minister of Britain, and Nelson was scouring the Mediterranean and the Atlantic for
the French fleet that he encountered with fatal consequences at Trafalgar.
The same proposition was advanced in the U.S. in a speech on behalf of Oliver
Evans before the Supreme Court in relation to the same Hopper Boy patent that had
been the subject of his earlier correspondence with Thomas Jeffersono in Evans v.
Eaton l in the following language:
That a new modus operandi, by a new combination of old instruments
or machines, so as to produce either a new effect, or an old effect in a new
way, is the proper subject matter of a patent, appears from numerous
authorities, and may be considered as a settled principle of the patent law.
It was on this principle that Watt's patent for his improvements on the
steam engine, which made so much noise in Westminster Hall, and
produced such important effects, was finally supported and established.
The English law of patents, though different from ours in its origin,
was probably the same in its principles. Indeed, our act of Congress was a
mere enactment of the principles and system, which the English Courts had
82
established.
The U.K. decision in Crane v. Price8 3 has been cited with approval in subsequent
decisions both in the U.K. and in the U.S. and indeed has been referred to by a 19th
century U.S. textbook writer as a "very important case."8 4 The claimed invention in

Crane was to the use in the smelting of iron from ironstone of anthracite in
combination with a hot air blast, both individually known.8 5 The evidence was that
the new process improved the yield of iron, improved the quality of the iron, and
reduced cost compared to an older method in which bituminous coal was used.8 6 The
Court of Common Pleas affirmed that the claimed invention was valid and said:
We are of the opinion, that if the result produced by such a
combination is either a new article, or a better article, or a cheaper article
78 (1803)

1 Web. P.C. 85 (K.B.).

79 THOMAS TERRELL, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS

32 (London Henry Sweet) (1884). Terrell continues to be a leading U.K. textbook on U.K. patent law
and the current (16th) edition is published by Sweet & Maxwell, the successors of Henry Sweet. The
first edition is in the public domain and can be downloaded as two pdf files from the Franklin Pierce
Law Centre IP Mall (www.ipmall.info).
80See Letter, Isaac M'Pherson, supra note 16, at 180.
8120 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
82 Id. at 399.
83 (1842) 1 Web. P.C. 393 (K.B.) (appeal from Court of Common Pleas) (Eng.).
84 GEORGE T. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS AS
ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (4th ed., Little, Brown, & Co.

1873).
85Crane, 1 Web. P.C. at 399.
8cId.

[8:1 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

to the public, than that produced before by the old method, that such
combination is an invention or manufacture intended by the statute, and
may well become the subject of a patent.87
An example where the Supreme Court made an affirmative finding that the
88
invention as claimed provided a new result is provided by Winans v Denmead,
which concerned a railroad car for transporting coal or other bulk goods as shown
below.89
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The patented car had a frustoconical body whose lower portion extended within
the frame of the truck and between the axles and terminated in a bottom discharge
outlet. 90 Advantages for the claimed form of the body were that the pressure of the
load was equalized in every direction so that the load was largely self-supporting and
tensile strength of the iron of which the body was made was used more efficiently. 91
Railroad cars in the prior art could not carry a load greater than their own weight,
whereas those constructed in accordance with the patent could carry twice their own
weight. 92 A majority of the Supreme Court justices in Winans were convinced that
an invention had indeed been made and their opinion is notable because it was
handed down in the same time frame as Hotchkiss v Greenwood.93 The Winans court
observed that:

87

88

Id. at 375, 409.

56 U.S. 330 (1854).

S Id. at 338; U.S. Patent No. 5,175 figs.2-3 (filed June 26, 1847).
90 Winans, 56 U.S. at 339.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 340.
9 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850) (holding that if no more ingenuity and skill was necessary to
construct a new knob than "were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,"
the patent was invalid); Winans, 56 U.S. at 341 (stating that the substance of the railroad car "is a
new mode of operation, by mean of which a new result is obtained").
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To change the form of an existing machine, and by means of such a
change to introduce and employ other mechanical principles or natural
powers, or, as it is termed a new mode of operation, and thus attain a new
and useful result, is the subject of a patent.
Its substance is a new mode of operation, by means of which a new
result is obtained. It is this new mode of operation which gives it the
character of an invention, and entitles the inventor to a patent; and this
new mode of operation is, in view of patent law, the thing entitled to
protection.
Patentable improvements
changing some one or more
introducing some mechanical
existing in the machine, and so

in machinery are almost always made by
forms of one or more parts, and thereby
principle or mode of action not previously
94
securing a new or improved result.

The legal significance of evidence establishing that a new result has been
achieved was identified by Mr. Justice Bradley in Loom Co. v. Higgins95 and his
explanation was cited with approval in subsequent cases, including Washburn &
Moen Manufacturing,Co. v. Beat'Em All Barbed-Wire Co. 96 and Carnegie Steel Co.
v. Cambria Iron Co. 9 7 The invention in Loom concerned a loom for weaving Brussels
carpet that could make 50 yards per day whereas the looms of the prior art could not
make more than 40 yards per day. 98 The court, affirming the validity of the patent,
warned about the dangers of hindsight analysis and stated, "[ilt may be laid down as
a general rule, though perhaps not an invariable one, that if a new combination and
arrangement of known elements produce a new and beneficial result, never attained
before, it is evidence of invention." 99
Perhaps the best simple example of new result is found in the Washburn case,
which concerned a patent covering the first successful form of barbed wire, one of its
drawings appearing below. 100

9 Winans, 56 U.S. at 341-42.
9 105 U.S. 580, 591 (1881).
96 143 U.S. 275, 283 (1892) (noting that in the Loom case, '

monopoly [was] sustained in
favour of the last series of inventors, all of whom were groping to attain a certain result, which only
the last one of the number seemed able to grasp").
97 185 U.S. 403, 437-38 (1902) (discussing Justice Bradley's observations in the Loom case,
specifically, whether the sufficiency of the description of the invention as the basis for sustaining
patents).
98 Loom Co., 105 U.S. at 583-84.
9 Id. at 591 (emphasis added). See also KSR Int'l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739
(2007) (stating that "[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to
be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results," which is consistent with the Court's
language in Loom). In KSR, the Court disagreeing with the Court of Appeals narrow and rigid
approach, not only reaffirmed the rule that a new result provides evidence of nonobviousness, but
also asserted that as to "the question of obviousness, [the Court's engagement with] cases have set
forth an expansive and flexible approach." Id.
100Washburn, 143 U.S. at 281-83 (noting twisted wire and sharp thorns or barbs to be
unpatentable known elements, however, ruling their combination to be an invention, as evidenced
by their new and beneficial result); see U.S. Patent No. 157,124 fig.3 (filed Oct. 27, 1873).
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The features which were held to support patentability were (a) "the introduction
of the coiled barb," and (b) its combination with the twisted wire, so that the barb
was held rigidly in place and held against either turning relative to the wire of
moving along the wire. 10 1 These features were held to provide "a most valuable
102
contribution to the art of wire fencing."
A further well-known example of new result supporting patentability is found in
the United States v. Adams, 10 3 where the Supreme Court found that the Adams
invention provided:
[Tihe first practical, water-activated, constant potential battery which
could be fabricated and stored indefinitely without any fluid in its cells. It
could be activated within 30 minutes merely by adding water. Once
activated, the battery continued to deliver electricity at a voltage which
remained essentially constant regardless of the rate at which current was
withdrawn.
Furthermore, its capacity for generating current was
exceptionally large in comparison to its size and weight. 104
The patent specification stated that "an object of the invention was to provide a
battery rendered serviceable by the mere addition of water," and the Supreme Court
held that "reliance upon this feature was not the afterthought of an astute trial
lawyer." 10 5 If the electrodes in the Adams battery had been merely equivalents to
those in prior art devices, then the Adams battery would have had equivalent
operating characteristics, whereas it had been found "wholly unexpectedly" that it
had "certain valuable operating advantages over other batteries." 10 6 In KSR, the
Supreme Court quoted Adams with approval and commented that "[tihe fact that the
elements worked together in an unexpected and fruitful manner supported the
107
conclusion that Adams's design was not obvious to those skilled in the art."

101

Id. at 281.

102Id.

383 U.S. 39 (1966).
When the cuprous chloride and magnesium were used as electrodes in an
electrolyte of either plain water or salt water, an improved battery resulted. Id.
105 Id. at 48-49.
103
104

Id. at 43.

106
Id. at 51.
107 KSR Int'l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007).
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In the U.K., judicial approval of the positive form of the collocation/combination
test was given by the House of Lords in British Celanese Ltd. v. CourtauldsLtd.108
in an often overlooked second part of the observations of Lord Tomlin stated, "where
the old integers when placed together have some working inter-relation producing a
new or improved result then there is patentable subject-matter in the idea of a
109
working inter-relation brought about by the collocation of the integers."
Examples of new function or result which have supported patentability in the
United Kingdom in recent cases follow.
In Beecham Group Ltd. ' (Amoxyeillin) Applieation,110 the combination of
properties exhibited by amoxycillin was significant:
it exhibited high activity
combined with high achieved blood level and these properties were neither disclosed
nor suggested by the prior art.111
In Fiehera v. Flogates,112 the invention concerned a ladle for molten steel having
a bottom discharge outlet closed by a sliding gate valve, and the improvement
involved the provision of a ring of refractory material in the bottom of the ladle, a
bush with a vertical hole for tapping metal mounted in the ring, and a stationary
refractory plate having an upper surface on which the bush rested and a lower
surface along which the valve slid.113 The bush was well known in a different form of
bottom discharge outlet, and the defendants objected that the provision of this wellknown bush in a known form of outlet was within the range of variants which a
skilled person would make without invention. 11 4 However, the effect of the change
was to move the seat of erosion by the molten steel from the sliding parts of the valve
to the top of the bush, where it is less damaging, and to enable the outlet to be used
to pour many charges of molten steel instead of only a single charge as in the prior
art. 115 Both the Patents Court and the Court of Appeal held on the basis of the
evidence adduced that the patent was valid and warned against treating dismissively
116
apparently small changes to seemingly simple structures.
In Moinlycke AB v. Proctor & Gamble Ltd.,117 the invention concerned a
disposable diaper which could be opened and re-fastened.1 18 Its novel feature was
that a single plastics strip was provided extending across the diaper at one end for
fastening of tape tabs from the other end, the surface texture of the plastics strip
being such as to control adhesion and permit tab removal and re-fastening.1 1 9 The
effect of this feature was to provide a landing surface with different characteristics
from the back-sheet so that each could be independently optimised.1 20 Both the
108

(1935) 52 R.P.C. 171 (H.L.) (U.K.).

109

Id. at 193.

110 [1980] R.P.C. 261 (A.C. (Civ. Div.)) (U.K.).
111 See id. at 293. Lord Justice Buckley held that "[t]he evidence does not suggest that a higher

blood level was an objective which Beecham had particularly in mind or that there was any reason
to expect it." Id.
112 Fichera v. Flogates, [1984] R.P.C. 257 (A.C. 1983) (appeal taken from Patents Court) (U.K.).
113 Id. at 274-75.
111See id. at 276
H5 See id. at 276.
116 Id. at 274 (holding the invention as not obvious).
117 [1994] R.P.C. 49 (A.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Patents Court) (U.K.).
118 Id. at 120.
119
120

d.

Id.

at 120-21.
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Patents Court and the Court of Appeal held that the added feature provided a novel
solution to the problem of providing tapes that could be securely re-fastened without
tearing the back-sheet and that the patent was valid. 121 The Court of Appeal
observed that:
[T]he inventive step may not have been large and it is not surprising to
us that more than one inventor may have broadly the same idea at around
the same time. Where the subject-matter of a patent is an idea, the
inventive step involves having an insight which, although simple, genuinely
requires an act of insight rather than a mere development and application
of existing ideas. 122
In Haberman,123 the use in an infants' trainer cup of a self-closing slit valve
solved the long-standing problem that such cups were prone to leak when upset. 124
In Dyson Appliances Ltd. v. Hoover Ltd.,125 the use of an upstream lowefficiency cyclone in a vacuum cleaner enabled it to separate carpet fluff, thread,
paper shreds, dog hairs and the like and avoid so-called "hang-up" i.e. material
within the cyclone which kept spinning about without being deposited. 126
In Conor Medsystems v. Angiotech 127 the incorporation of taxol into a drugeluting coating on a stent to prevent unwanted cell proliferation leading to
restenosis, the patent specification not containing proof that taxol would have the
desired effect but nevertheless containing sufficient information to make that effect
plausible.

128

It is clear, however, that although a new result is evidence of inventive step, it is
not conclusive. For example, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood129 the claimed invention
was the substitution of clay or porcelain for metal in knobs for furniture or doors. 130
The inventors explained that their invention was chiefly predicated on one principle,
which was that of having the cavity in which the screw or shank is inserted largest at
its inner end in the form of a dovetail and forming the screw or shank by pouring in
molten metal.131
The evidence was that this construction had been used in
Middletown, Connecticut before the invention for making metallic knobs. 132 It could
be argued that the invention was more than a mere substitution of materials because

121Id. at 93, 132.
122Id. at 132.
123Haberman v. Jackel Int'l., [1999] F.S.R. 683 (Ch. (Pat. Ct.)) (U.K.).
124Id.at 701-04. The court observed that Mrs. Haberman had "taken

a very small and simple
step" to incorporate a slit valve into an infant's trainer cup, but it was a step others "could have
taken at any time over at least the preceding ten years or more." Id. at 706. The resulting
commercial success, that was "almost entirely due to ...the simple slit valve," led the court to
conclude that the invention was not obvious. Id. at 704, 706.
125 [2001] EWCA 1440, [2002] R.P.C. 22 (U.K.).
126

Id.at [4] and [10].

[2008] UKHL 49, [2008] R.P.C. 28 (appeal taken from Eng.).
at [36].
129 52 U.S. 248 (1850).
130 Id. at 248-49.
131 Id. at 250.
132 Id.at 252.
127

128 Id.
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metal is tough whereas clay or porcelain is brittle and prone to crack. 133 The
patentees argued that it required skill and thought and invention to unite these
dissimilar materials and make a firm and substantial product, and it was accepted
that the choice of a dovetail construction avoided cracking or breakage of the clay or
porcelain whereas the other possible method of fastening using a hole or screw did
not. 134 There was also evidence of commercial success and that the patented knobs
were "almost everywhere taking the place of the metal knob." 135 Justice Woodbury
(dissenting) was of the opinion that if there was a new effect then even though the
change was slight there was scope for a patent, and in addition to the dovetail
construction he also pointed to the durability, cheapness and beauty of the patented
knobs. 136 However, the majority view was that any difference had to be "the result of
some new contrivance or arrangement in the manufacture," that (arguably
incorrectly from a technical standpoint) the anti-cracking effect was the same as that
in a knob of wood, bone, metal or any other material, and that the substitution was
the work of a skilled mechanic, not an inventor 137 .

III. U.K.

AND U.S. CONSEQUENCES WHEN NEW RESULT EVIDENCE CANNOT BE
ADDUCED

What should be the consequences if either (a) the claimed combination of
features provides no new result or (b) there is such a result but it is not disclosed in
the written description? It is self-evident that the weight of evidence for inventive
character of the claimed subject matter is significantly or fatally weakened even if
circumstantial evidence such as failure of others and commercial success is
available. 138 But should there be any legal consequence beyond what is inevitable on
the basis of straightforward analysis of the evidence?

13 Id.at 266-67.
134Id.at 252.

Id. at 256.
136 Id.at 268 ('[W]hereas in my view the true test of it being patentable was, if the invention
was new, and better and cheaper than what preceded it.") (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
137Id. at 266. The fact pattern raises could/would issues: a skilled person undoubtedly could
have made porcelain knobs with the dovetail metal insert, but would he have known or would it
have been obvious to him prior to the date of the invention that this structure would solve the
problem of uniting a metal screw or shank to a clay or porcelain knob? Id. at 266-67 ("It seemed to
be supposed, on the argument, that this mode of fastening the shank to the clay knob produced a
new and peculiar effect upon the article ... that for this reason the clay or porcelain knob was not so
liable to crack or be broken."). However, the patentees were in a weak position to rely on any such
argument because the problem of cracking and its solution by the dovetail insert were nowhere
mentioned in their specification, and in any event it is unlikely that arguments of this type would
have been persuasive in the less developed state of patent law as it was in 1850. Id. at 267 (stating
that the first issue on the record was "whether the patent covered merely the knob, the bulbous
handle, or included also the shank or spindle, and the mode of fastening it to the handle").
138C. EPO Guidelines, supra note 71, at pt. C, ch. IV, 2.1-2.2 (setting forth what is mean by
not obvious and consequently inventive combination of features).
135
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An approach which has been suggested by the U.K. House of Lords in SabafSpA
v. MFI Furniture Centres Ltd., 139 is to treat it as a matter of claim construction and
of identifying what is alleged to have been invented. 140 Lord Hoffmann observed:
I quite agree that there is no law of collocation in the sense of a
qualification of, or gloss upon, or exception to, the test for obviousness
stated in section 3 of the Act. But before you can apply section 3 and ask
whether the invention involves an inventive step, you first have to decide
what the invention is. In particular, you have to decide whether you are
dealing with one invention or two or more inventions. Two inventions do
not become one invention because they are included in the same hardware.
A compact motor car may contain many inventions, each operating
independently of each other but all designed to contribute to the overall goal
of having a compact car. That does not make the car a single invention. 141
Section 14(5)(d) of the Act provides (following article 82 of the
European Patent Convention ("EPC")) that a claim shall 'relate to one
invention or to a group of inventions which are so linked as to form a single
inventive concept. 142 Although this is a procedural requirement with which
an application must comply, it does suggest that the references in the Act to
an 'invention' (as in section 3) are to the expression of a single inventive
1
concept and not to a collocation of separate inventions. 43
The EPO guidelines say that "the invention claimed must normally be
considered as a whole." 144 But equally, one must not try to consider as a
whole what are in fact two separate inventions. What the Guidelines do is
to state the principle upon which you decide whether you are dealing with a
single invention or not. 145 If the two integers interact upon each other, if
there is synergy between them, they constitute a single invention having a
combined effect and one applies section 3 to the idea of combining them.146
If each integer "performs its own proper function independently of any of
the others," then each is for the purposes of section 3 a separate invention
and it has to be applied to each one separately. 147
Advantages of this approach are that it is objective and free of the prejudice and
emotional baggage that characterises many earlier decisions on this topic. An
inventor in the mechanical engineering field does not need or deserve the put-down of
being told how unusual it is to find invention in his field of endeavour-8 or how long
139

Sabaf SpA v. MFI Furniture Centres Ltd., [2004] UKHL 45, [2005] R.P.C. 10 (appeal taken

from Eng.).
140 Id. at [24].
141

Id.

142

Id. at [25].

H:3 Id.
144

Id. at [26].

145

Id.
Id.
Id.

146
147

148 See also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1951)
(Justice Jackson stating "[e]lements may, of course, especially in chemistry or electronics, take on
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the path that the inventor of a better mousetrap has to tread before reaching the
Patent Office. 149 Instead, he simply needs a straightforward decision on the facts of
his case firstly whether or not there is indeed a new function that enables the
features that he has claimed to be identified as a true combination and provides
evidence in support of patentability and secondly whether patentability can be
established on the basis of that evidence or whether there is some reason why that
evidence should not be decisive e.g., "obvious to try," "one way street" or mere "bonus
effect."

150

The views of Thomas Jefferson have been set out above. Decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court under the pre-1952 statutes lay down a "bright line" rule that
absence of new result is fatal to validity. The opinion of Justice Jackson in the Great
Atlantie & Paeifie Tea case isrepresentative of many judicial observations on this
topic:
Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care
proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an
assembly of old elements. The function of a patent is to add to the sum of
useful knowledge. Patents cannot be sustained when, on the contrary, their
effect is to subtract from former resources freely available to skilled
artisans. A patent for a combination which only unites old elements with
no change in their respective functions, such as is presented here, obviously
withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and
diminishes the resources available to skillful men. 151
Restatements of the same bright-line rule are found in post-1952 decisions in
Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Savage Co. 152 and in Sakraida v. AG Pro,
Inc. 153 It could, however, be argued that since there is no bright-line rule for a
finding of non-obviousness if evidence of new result can be adduced, then a balanced
approach must preclude a bright-line rule for a finding of obviousness if no such
evidence is available. 154 A problem with bright-line rules is that they can be applied
some new quality or function from being brought into concert, but this is not a usual result of
uniting elements old in mechanics.").
14) Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966).
150EPO Guidelines, supra note 71, at pt. C, ch. IV, 11.9.
'5' Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1951).
The
basis for the alleged "difficulty and improbability" is not apparent: if (as seems probable) it was
earlier opinions of the courts then it is anecdotal, and may reflect the prejudice of a non-technical
court more than scientific or engineering reality. Mechanical engineering inventions that are
litigated may not be representative of the generality of such inventions since it may be that in the
U.S. only the weaker patents come before the courts so that the courts see a statistically biased
sample. No rigorously conducted and peer-reviewed academic study of mechanical engineering
inventions appears to have been considered, if indeed, such studies were available at the time.
Similarly, the author was recently told by members of a leading firm of patent attorneys in China
that foreign patent owners are successful in 75% of cases brought before the Chinese courts, but in
this case it may be only the very strong patents that are considered suitable candidates for
enforcement proceedings.
152 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
153 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
154 C. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. U.S., 147 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
"Evidence of
secondary considerations is but a part of the 'totality of the evidence' that is used to reach the
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inappropriately, and there was much discussion of a requirement for "synergy"
during the 1960's and 1970's which predates the establishment of the Federal Circuit
in 1982 and is now, fortunately, of historical interest only. 155 At the time, Judge
Markey who was the chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
was driven to say, "[oinly God works from nothing. Man must work with old
elements." 156 In Stratoflex Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,1 57 Judge Markey also stated that:
A requirement for "synergism" or a "synergistic effect" is nowhere found in
the statute, 35 U.S.C. When present, for example in a chemical case,
synergism may point toward nonobviousness, but its absence has no place
in evaluating the evidence on obviousness. The more objective findings
suggested in Graham .. .are drawn from the language of the statute and

are fully adequate guides for evaluating the evidence relating to compliance
with 35 U.S.C. § 103 .... The reference to a "combination patent" is equally
without support in the statute ....

Reference to "combination" patents is,

moreover, meaningless. Virtually a]] patents are "combination patents," if
by that label one intends to describe patents having claims to inventions
formed of a combination of elements. It is difficult to visualize, at least in
the mechanical-structural arts, a "non-combination" invention, i.e., an
invention consisting of a single element. Such inventions, if they exist, are
rare indeed. 158

It should be noted that the Federal Circuit did not overrule the judgment of the
Circuit Court, which it held to be supported on the conventional basis set out in
Graham. 159 However, the Circuit Court's findings on "synergism" that the claim
"lack[ed] the unique essence of authentic contribution to the [relevant] art which is at
160
the heart of invention" were held to be flawed for the reasons set out above.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit's ruling on exclusion of evidence is wholly
inconsistent with the existence of any bright-line rule:
It is jurisprudentially inappropriate to disregard any relevant evidence on
any issue in any case, patent cases included. .

.

. Indeed, evidence of

secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent
evidence in the record. It may often establish that an invention appearing
to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not. It is to be considered
as part of all the evidence, not just when the decisionmaker remains in
doubt after reviewing the art.
ultimate conclusion of obviousness." Id. "In some cases, this evidence is the most probative of
obviousness, but its existence or non-existence does not control the obviousness determination." Id.
155 See, e.g., Sakraida,425 U.S. at 281-82. ("We cannot agree that the combination of these old
elements .. .can be properly characterized as synergistic, that is 'resulting in an effect greater than
the sum of the several effects taken separately."') (quoting Anderson's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 61).
150 Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute2 65 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 331, 334
(1983).
157 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
158 Id. at 1540.
159 Id,
100 Id.
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...En route to a conclusion on obviousness, a court must not stop until
allpieces of evidence on that issue have been fully considered and each has
been given its appropriate weight. Along the way, some pieces will weigh
more heavily than others, but decision should be held in abeyance, and
161
doubt maintained, until all the evidence has had its say.

Since 1982, the Federal Circuit has used the teaching-suggestion-motivation
(TSM) test which was in issue in KSR and has applied that test without objection
from the Supreme Court for two decades, with arguments based on the negative
aspect of collocation/combination or on a bright-line requirement for "synergy" having
lost all significance. 162 The test isnow whether a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have been motivated to combine the prior art to achieve the claimed invention
and whether there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in doing
163

SO.

In KSR, essentially the same objection arose as in Crane v. Price and indeed as
preoccupies prosecution attorneys on a daily basis: A is known, B is known and there
was [allegedly] no inventive step in combining them. 164
It was open to the Supreme Court to reassert the bright-line test that it
unequivocally set out in Sakraida v Ag Pro Inc. 165 Significantly, however, in KSR,
161 Id. at 1538-39. The concept of evidential weights to be placed in the judicial scales to see
where the preponderance of evidence lies flows naturally from the Graham test, the Windsurfing
test and the observations in Loom that a new result is evidence of invention. See Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain), Ltd., [1985]
R.P.C. 59 (U.K.); Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580 (1881).
l 2 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741-42 (stating that "inthe years since the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals set forth the essence of the TSM test, the Court of Appeals no
doubt has applied the test . . .in many cases" and has transformed "the general principle into a
rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry"). The Court in KSR stated that the question of
obviousness called for a "flexible and expansive approach." Id. at 1739. See also Loom Co. v.
Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 583-84 (1881) (stating the general rule that if "new combination and
arrangement of known elements produce a new and beneficial result, never attained before, it is
evidenco of invention") (emphasis added).
163See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1124
(Fed. Cir. 2000); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C. H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d
1356, 1366 (2006).
161KSR Int'l, 127 S. Ct. at 1746 (2007) (finding that KSR provided evidence which
demonstrated "that mounting a modular sensor on a fixed pivot point of the Asano pedal was a
design step well within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art" and holding the
patent invalidated because it was obvious); Crane v. Price, (1842) 1 Web. P.C. 393, 409 (K.B.)
(appeal from Court of Common Pleas) (U.K.) (stating "that if the result produced by such a
combination is either a new article, or a better article .... than that produced before the old method,
that such combination is an invention ...and may well become ... a patent.").
161Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976). The language that the Court could have,
but fortunately refrained from reasserting, reads: "We cannot agree that the combination of these
old elements .. .can properly be characterized as synergistic, that is, 'result[ing] in an effect greater
than the sum of the several effects taken separately'." Id. (quoting Anderson's-Black Rock v.
Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969). The Court went on to say, "[r]ather, this patent simply
arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform,
although perhaps producing a more striking result than in previous combinations.
Such
combinations are not patentable under standards appropriate for a combination patent. Id. (citation
omitted).
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the Court refrained from the use of bright-line language and instead used language
reflecting caution and a need to evaluate the evidence as a whole. The Court stated,
"[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results" 166 but, as previously
noted, it went on to say that "a court must ask whether the improvement is more
than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions." 167 The "curious incident"l(08 is that although the KSR Court concluded
that the claimed invention was obvious and admonished that the TSM test should
not be transformed from a general principle into a rigid rule, it nevertheless followed
the route suggested by Judge Markey in Stratolex and decided the question on the
conventional
grounds set out in Graham and without reference
to
collocation/combination or "synergy" issues. 169 The decision to adopt this approach is
consistent with a positive decision not to re-initiate the previous "synergy" debate,
and it is submitted that if the "curious incident" is to be treated as a clue, then the
solution that should be deduced from that clue is a significant (though tacit)
guideline for the handling of future cases, i.e. that "synergy" considerations are not to
be invoked widely or indiscriminately. Indeed, putting forward any bright-line rule
would have been inconsistent with the court's admonition that the approach should
17 0
be "expansive and flexible."
Nevertheless, a litigator acting for a patentee who is not in a position to adduce
evidence of new result and is conducting a good fact/bad fact analysis should place
that deficiency firmly in the "bad facts" column. If the new result exists, but the
written description of the patent fails to mention it, then following observations in
Adams, a litigator representing a patentee should also place that deficiency firmly in
the "bad facts" column. 171 Although a bright-line rule has not been reasserted,
enforcement of a patent where no new result can be identified or is disclosed in the
17 2
patent must be considered to be very difficult.

166 KSRInt'l, 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
107 Id. at 1731 (emphasis added); see also Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.3d 1530,
1535-36 (1983) (discussing the scope and content of the prior art and the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art).
168 DOYLE, supra note 4.
169Id. at 1739, 1745.
170 Id. at 1739.
171 Seo generally United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966) (finding that the Adams
patent was valid because the "obvious implication from the absence of any mention of an electrolyte,
a necessary element in any battery, in the other eight claims" reinforced the conclusion that the
batter was water activated). "While the claims of a patent limit the invention, and specifications
cannot be utilized to expand the patent monopoly ... it is fundamental that claims are to be
construed in light of the specifications and both are to be read with a view to ascertaining the
invention. Id.
172 See generally Cuno Eng'g. Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp, 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) ("A new
application of an old device may not be patented if the 'result claimed as new is the same in
character as the original result' ... even though the new result had not before been contemplated.")
(citations omitted).
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IV. EPC - NEW RESULT EVIDENCE IS MANDATORY
The EPC resulted from negotiations that took place in the 1960's and 1970's and
a requirement for non-obviousness was written into the Convention from the
outset. 173 The EPO applies a test that is overtly result-based, and goes further than
the U.S. or the U.K. as it makes the existence of a new result flowing from claimed
features in combination a mandatory condition for patentability. 174 Surprisingly,
this difference arises from the Regulations under the Patent Cooperation Treaty
("PCT") and the EPC, which as previously noted, differ from the rules made in the
U.K. under the Patents Act, 1977.175
Rule 5(a)(iii) PCT provides that the description of a patent specification shall
disclose the invention, as claimed, in such terms that the technical problem (even if
not expressly stated as such) and its solution can be understood" Rule 42(1)(c) EPC,
formerly Rule 27(1)(c) EPC, is identically worded. 176 The EPO appeal boards regard
the reference to technical problem contained in this rule as providing the
fundamental basis for their technical problem based approach. As explained in
Con tainers/ICIT 0026/81:
The provisions of Rule 27(1)(d) require that the description shall
disclose how the invention can be understood as the solution to a technical
problem. Indeed, the inventive step may be considered as a step from the
technical problem to its solution. If, therefore, the requirements of the above
rule are neither satisfied by the original description, nor, after request, by
an amendment, it will emerge that an invention within the meaning of
Article 52 does not exist. On the other hand, if the subject-matter of an
independent claim, for which there is sufficient disclosure, is judged as
being inventive in character, it must always be possible to derive a technical
problem from the application. 177
It should not be assumed that the words "technical problem" have the same
meaning when they are used by the EPO as they do in the U.K. or the U.S. Much of
the controversy in relation to the technical problem test arises through
misunderstanding of the meaning given by the EPO to these words. In the U.K. and
U.S. they are generally understood to refer to a real-world problem whose existence

173 Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 56, Oct. 5, 1973, available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/contents.html
[hereinafter
"EPC"]
(providing "an invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the
state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art").
17'EPO Guidelines, pt. C, ch. IV, 11.5 (stating "a set of technical features is regarded as a
combination of features if the functional interaction between the features achieves a combined
technical effect which is different from, e.g. greater than, the sum of technical effects of the
individual features").
175 See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, pt. I, § 14 (U.K.) (last amended Dec. 17, 2007) available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf (setting forth the requirements for the "making of
application" and making no reference to "technical problem").
176 European Patent Office, European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, R. 42 Content of the
Description.
177 ICI/Containers, [1979-85] E.P.O.R. B362, 365 (EPO (Technical Bd. App.)).
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is apparent from the cited literature or from the testimony of expert witnesses. 178 In
the EPO Guidelines they are understood more usually to relate to an artificially
constructed problem derived on the basis of the particular technical success achieved
by the inventor(s) vis-A-vis the closest prior art which has first to be identified.179
That fact is apparent from the EPO Guidelines, Part C, IV-25 which read:
In the second stage, one establishes in an objective way the technical
problem to be solved. To do this one studies the application (or the patent),
the closest prior art and the difference . . . in terms of technical features
(either structural or functional) between the invention and the closest prior
art and then formulates the technical problem.
In this context . . . the technical problem means the aim and task of
modifying or adapting the closest prior art to provide the technical effects
that the invention provides over the closest prior art. 180
The EPO Appeal Board decision in AgrEvolTriazolel l is a leading authority on
this point. It concerned a class of herbicides.18 2 The EPO held that for patentability
herbicidal activity had to be expected for all members of the class.18 3 It based its
opinion on the principle that the extent of the patent monopoly should correspond to
and be justified by the technical contribution to the art that was contained in the
specification.1 8 4 Although the analysis was expressed in terms of a technical problem
and its solution, that problem could be a reconstruction from what the invention
achieved in relation to the prior art.1 8 5 The decision explains that:
"...the Board of Appeal consistently decide the issue of obviousness on the
basis of an objective assessment of the technical results achieved by the
claimed subject matter, compared with the results obtained according to the
state of the art. It is then assumed that the inventor did in fact seek to
achieve these results and therefore these results are taken to be the basis
for defining the technical problem..."186
It went on to explain that mere structural ingenuity was not sufficient.1 8 7 If the
result that the skilled person was seeking to achieve was simply "obtaining further
chemical compounds, then all known chemical compounds [were] equally suitable as
the starting point" and all known methods of transformation might be used, so that

178

See gene-rally Greg Aharonian, Why All Business Methods Achieve a Technical Effect?, J.

INFO. L. & TECH. (July 4, 2003), availableat

http ://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2003_1/software/aharonian/#a2.
179 EPO Guidelines, supra note 71, pt. C, ch. 4, 11.7-11.7.1.
180 Id. at 11.7.2.
181 [1996] E.P.O.R. 171 (EPO (Technical Bd. App.)).
182 Id. at 175.
183 Id. at 185-86.
184 Id. at 180.
185

Id.

186

Id. at 180-81.
See id at 182.

187
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the selection of particular compounds to be made was a mere arbitrary choice. 188 For
that reason, "the selection of such compounds, in order to be patentable, must not be
arbitrary but must be justified by a hitherto unknown technical effect which is
caused by those structural features which distinguish the claimed compounds from
18 9
the numerous other such compounds."
Identification of an undisclosed problem is consistent with the above effectbased approach, as exemplified by the EPO Appeal Board decision in
Rider/Simethicone Tablet.190 The problem of inactivation of simethicone by antacid
material was known and was believed to have been overcome in commercial
tablets. 191 However, the applicants had discovered that the simethicone still lost its
activity when such tablets were stored and had recognized that the reason was that
the simethicone, which was an oil, was migrating through the solid material of the
tablet. 192 The solution was to incorporate a barrier layer to stop the oil migrating
into the antacid. 193 The Appeal Board held that in the previous state of knowledge a
barrier layer would have been perceived as "superfluous, wasteful and devoid of any
technical effect," whereas it had now been recognized that a barrier layer produced a
substantial effect not predictable from the prior art. 194 Accordingly a patent was
195
granted.
Circumstantial evidence is admissible before the EPO, but is generally
considered of limited value. 196
The classic decision on this point is Metal
BASF/Metal Roofing where the Appeal Board contrasted the "subjective problem"
(i.e. the problem that the inventor believed he was facing when he carried out the
work that lead to the invention) with the "objective problem" (i.e. the problem that
must be defined from the actual state of the art) and explained that:
When assessing inventive step .. .it is not a question of the subjective
achievement of the inventor . .. [i]t is rather the objective achievement
which has to be assessed. As in the case of novelty, inventive step is an
objective concept. Objectivity in the assessment of inventive step is achieved
by starting out from the objectively prevailing state of the art, in the light of
which the problem is determined which the invention addresses and solves
from an objective point of view . . . and considerations is given to the
question of the obviousness of the disclosed solution to this problem as seen
by the man skilled in the art and having those capabilities which can be
objectively expected of him.
The appellant sees the fact that the steel industry has passed by the
method as applied for, despite the significant economic contribution it
makes to solving the environmental problems in this field, as an indication
188 Id.
189

Id. at 182.

190 [1979-85] E.P.O.R. 715 (EPO (Technical Bd.App.)).

191 Id.at 716.
192
193

Id. at 717.
Id.

Id. at 719.
Id. at 720.
196 See generallyBASF/MetalRoofing, [1979-85] E.P.O.R. B354 (EPO (Technical Bd.App.)).
194
195
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of the presence of inventive step. The Board takes the view that, as against
the assessment of inventive step from the objective point of view ... a mere
investigation for indications of the presence of inventive step is no
substitute for the technically skilled assessment of the invention vis-a-vis
the state of the art, pursuant to Article 56 EPC.197
It is relevant to ask why a bright-line requirement for new result has lead to a
test before the EPO that commands widespread acceptance, or at least the absence of
widely expressed disapproval, whereas in the U.S. it has created great difficulty and
has been largely abandoned, as also is the case in the U.K. One possible reason is
the approach, a sequence of questions, which the EPO Appeal Boards almost
invariably follow in the decisions that they hand down, and which is set out below:
(i) What is the technical field, or the purpose and effect, of the invention?
(ii) What was the most promising starting point prior art ("closest prior
art") prior art?
(iii) What is the technical problem that is solved by the difference(s) vis A
vis the closest prior art?
(iv) Does the claimed subject matter indeed provide a solution for the
technical problem?
(v) Was the technical problem known or obvious? If not;
(vi) Does the claimed subject matter provide no more than an obvious
solution?
(vii) Especially in the chemical, biochemical and biotechnology arts, was the
claimed solution obvious to try? If so, was there a reasonable expectation of
success?
(viii) Does the claimed subject matter fall within exception for selection
inventions or for new uses?198
In this sequence of questions, an attempt is made to identify a new function or
result and to reconstruct an objective technical problem from it, i.e. to identify any
positive merits of the invention, before considering whether the differences might be
objected to as obvious. 199 Starting from technical problem tends to make the
invention look big and predisposes to foresight analysis, whereas starting from the
differences as suggested by the wording of 35 U.S.C. § 103 tends to make the
invention look small and predisposes to hindsight analysis. 200 E = mc2 is a simple
197 Id.

at 357, 360.
See AgrEvo/Triazole, [1996] E.P.O.R. 171 (EPO (Technical Bd. App.)); BASF/Metal Refining,
[1979-85] E.P.O.R. B354 (EPO (Technical Bd. App.)); ICI/Containers, [1979-85] E.P.O.R. B362
(EPO (Technical Bd. App.)); Rider/Simethicone Tablet, [1979-85] E.P.O.R. 715 (EPO (Technical Bd.
App.)). See gene-rally EPO Guidelines, supra note 71, at pt. C, ch. 4 (discussing patentability,
including novelty, inventive step, technical problems, biotechnological inventions, etc.).
199See AgrEvo/Triazole, [1996] E.P.O.R. 171 (EPO (Technical Bd. App.)); BASF/Metal Refining,
[1979-85] E.P.O.R. B354 (EPO (Technical Bd. App.)); ICI/Containers, [1979-85] E.P.O.R. B362
(EPO (Technical Bd. App.)); Rider/Simethicone Tablet, [1979-85] E.P.O.R. 715 (EPO (Technical Bd.
App.)). See gene-rally EPO Guidelines, supra note 71, at pt. C, ch. 4 (discussing patentability,
including novelty, inventive step, technical problems, biotechnological inventions, etc.).
200 CompareEPO Guidelines, supra note 71, pt. C, ch. IV, with 13 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
198
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quadratic equation, isn't it? It did not need a genius to work out something that
simple, did it? It would be wrong to imply that decision makers whether under the
common law or under the EPC do less than their best to decide the cases before them
in a fair and objective manner. But this difference in starting point may in practice
have created and maintained significant differences in outlook.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is submitted that there is nothing under U.S, law, U.K. law or the EPC, which
mandates a high threshold of patentability, a low threshold of patentability, or even
a constitutional standard of patentability.
The old German concepts of
Erfindungsh6che and technical advance have not been carried forward into the
EPC. 20 1 Enquiries along these lines and comparison of differing national standards
inject heat, but not light, into the debate. All that is, and ever was, needed is an
objective evaluation of the claimed subject matter with the prior art according to the
evidence, as indeed Jefferson carried out in relation to the Oliver Evans
inventions. 202

The consequences of the Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 203 decision and
the resulting flood of preliminary issue or summary judgment motions have been to
produce a creeping tide of blandness in patent specifications, especially those in the
electrical and mechanical arts. Those who draft patents feel inhibited against
identifying specific items of prior art in the BACKGROUND section of the
specification.204 It would be inappropriate for a European practitioner to disregard
the compelling considerations that have lead to this development.
However,
compliance with prudent steps to avoid unintended limitation of claim scope should
not go so far as to exclude from the specification necessary statements of result
(including results associated with important dependant claims), statements of
advantage
and (where appropriate) experimental and other supporting
information. 20 5 European practitioners have never advocated U.S.-style object
201 Soo Laura R. Ford, Alohemy and Pntentnhility: Tehnology, Useful Art,," and the
ChimericalMind-Machine,42 CAL. W.L. REV. 49, 103 (2005) (discussing the merge of inventive step
and technical effect under the EPC and noting that "technical advance ... [was] note mentioned and
the English inventive step was explicitly incorporated," however "the language of technical effect
and technical advance [have not faded] from the European patent law scene").
202 See generallyLetter, Isaac M'Pherson, supra note 16.
203 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (reasoning that "treating interpretive issues as purely legal will
promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare
decisis on those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the
single appeals court" and holding "hold that the interpretation of the word "inventory" in this case is
an issue for the judge, not the jury").
204 The chemical, pharmaceutical and biotech people often still write the introduction to their
Ph.D. theses into the Background section of their specifications, so that you can expect to get to page
20 or page 30 before you find what the invention is. See also Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains
Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (cautioning trial courts to carefully distinguish
statements directed to a particular prior art device from statements directed to a general method
employed by that device, in a patent's background section or prosecution history).
205 See genora-y EPO Guidelines, supra note 71, pt. C, ch. 3, 3-4 (setting forth guidelines
regarding scope as it pertains to independent and dependent claims, alternative in claim, and clarity
and interpretation of claims).
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clauses, especially where such clauses inappropriately find their way into the
BACKGROUND section, and even more so when they then discuss in the
BACKGROUND section and implicitly admit as prior art matters that were unknown
prior to the invention and represent part of the inventor's contribution. What they
are more likely to recommend is objective statements of result and advantage to be
included in the DETAILED DESCRIPTION section, with no or minimal use of the
controversial word "preferably."
At risk of slight repetition, Rule 5 of the PCT Implementing Regulations
requires inter alia that the description shall:
(i) specify the technicalfield to which the invention relates;
(ii) indicate the background art which, as far as known to the
applicant, can be regarded as useful for the understanding, searching
and examination of the invention, and, preferably, cite the documents
reflectingsuch art; [and]
(iii) disclose the invention, as claimed, in such terms that the technical
problem (even if not expressly stated as such) and its solution can be
understood,and state the advantageouseffects, if any, of the invention
with reference to the background art.

20 6

The cases cited here show that this not merely a set of requirements for an
International application, but also advice which we disregard at our peril. It should
not be forgotten that KSR started with a motion for summary judgment; if our
specifications fail to disclose results and advantages which support inventive
character, KSR may have multiple summary judgment progeny and parallel
20 7
applications in the EPO will be unnecessarily difficult to prosecute.
The USPTO has been accused of having become significantly less applicantfriendly following the KSR decision. 208 This may reflect concerns about "patent
quality" and is reflected in the Guidelines given to examiners.20 9 A big difference is
210
noticeable between the EPO Examination Guidelines and those of the USPTO.

206 Patent Cooperation Treaty, with Regulations R. 5.1(a)(i)-(iii), June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T.
7645, availableat http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct-regs.pdf.
207 Compare World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO],
World Patent Report-A

StatisticalReview, at C.2.2 (2008), availableat
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo-pub-931.pdf
(stating
that in 2006, the U.S. and Japan received the largest shares of total non-resident patent grants),
with id. at C.2.1 (showing that the EPO granted approximately 60,000 non-resident patents in

2006).
208 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief and
Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995, 1040 (2007) ("Perhaps the greatest

effect of KSR will be to shift the burdens of production and persuasion to the patent holder (and
possibly limit the relevant evidence for rebuttal) once a prima facie case is made by the party
challenging validity that the invention is merely a combination of prior art elements performing
their expected (even if significantly improved) functions."). There is perhaps a tension between a
function being expected and it being significantly improved.
201) See Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 in View of
the Supreme Court Decision in KNSR -International
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57, 526 (Oct. 10,
2007) [hereinafter USPTO Examination Guidelines].
210 Compareid., with EPO Guidelines, supra note 71, pt. C, ch. IV, 11.
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The EPO Examination Guidelines at Part C Chapter IV give examples relating
to the requirement of inventive step. 211 Considerable care has been taken to balance
these examples. Examples illustrating the application of known measures in an
obvious way and in which inventive step can be ruled out are balanced by further
examples showing the application of known measures in a non-obvious way and in
which an inventive step is therefore to be recognized. 212 An example of an obvious
and consequently non-inventive combination of features is balanced by an example of
a non-obvious and consequently inventive combination of features. 213 Examples of
obvious and consequently non-inventive selection are balanced by examples of nonobvious and consequently inventive selection. 214 The single example relating to
overcoming a technical prejudice shows a situation where the application should be
allowed, not refused. 215 A reader of these Guidelines ismade aware that although
many applications are open to objection, there are many others that cover
216
meritorious inventions and should be allowed.
When the USPTO issued its post-KSR Guidelines, from the standpoint of a
prosecution attorney they made depressing reading. For example, the first heading
which refers to combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield
predictable results gives two examples, one of which is Andersons-Blaek Rock, Ine. v.
Pavement Salvage Co. 2 17 and the other of which is Ruiz v SAB Chance Co. 2 18 in both
of which obviousness was established. 219 There is no balancing example in which
inventive character was established. 220 There follow five other headings illustrated
by examples, each and every one of which shows the claimed subject matter to be
obvious.

221

The final heading concerns the TSM test which is not illustrated by any

example. 222
Under the heading "Consideration of Applicants Rebuttal Evidence"
there are cursory indications that an applicant might have something relevant to say
in reply, and that, for example, they might argue that the claimed elements in
combination do not merely perform the function that each element performs
separately. 223 Might it not have been a good idea to inform the Examining Corps
that if an applicant can demonstrate a new and unexpected result, this is strong
prima facie evidence of inventive step, that this fact is supported by several opinions
of the U.S. Supreme Court and that where such evidence is available an applicant
should unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary expect a grant decision to
follow? Experience in the EPO is that where an applicant can demonstrate a credible
technical problem that he has solved, he will almost always be granted a patent and
that although other objections, e.g. "one-way-street" or "bonus effect" are available,
211

EPO Guidelines, supra note 71, pt. C, ch. IV, 11.

212 Id. at 11.4.
213 Id. at 11.13.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 11.13.4.
216 Id. at 11.12.
217 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
218 357 F.3d 1270 (Fed.

Cir. 2004).

219 Andersons-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 62-63; Ruiz, 357 F.3d at 1277; Examination Guidelines,

72 Fed. Reg. at 57,529
220 See USPTO Examination Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. at 57,529-30.
221 Id. at 57, 530-33.
222 d. at 57, 534.
223

Id.
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circumstances where such objections succeed are rare, as acknowledged by the U.K.
224
High Court in Haberman.
Instructions to examiners are of general importance to the public because they
are the main tool used during examination and the important event for most
applicants is grant or refusal by the patent office, litigation of patents (even in the
U.S.) being uncommon. 225 Instructions are even more important for examiners who
are trainees and those who have only recently acquired signatory authority because
they are likely to rely chiefly on those instructions and to take some time to achieve a
deep understanding of case law. It is important to teach examiners when to make
objections and the appropriate grounds for doing so, but is it not equally important to
teach them when applications should be allowed and to show them examples of
patents whose validity has been upheld, as the EPO does?
Quality patent
examination is not just a matter of ensuring that applications lacking merit are
reliably refused, but also of ensuring that meritorious applications are reliably
granted.

224 Compare EPO Guidelines, supra note 71, pt. C, ch. IV, 11.9 (discussing the effects of "bonus
effect" and "one-way-street" on a finding of inventive step ), with Haberman v. Jackel Int'l, Ltd.,
[1999] F.S.R. 683, 697-98 (Ch. (Pat. Ct.)) (U.K.) (acknowledging the difficulty in reaching a decision
on the patent's validity because the patent seemed so obvious, but finding the patent to be valid
because if it the simple step taken by the patentee had been that obvious, someone in the art would
have found it much earlier).
225 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).

